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CONTROVERSY OVER THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE: SHOULD BATSON BE
EXPANDED?
Every individual is guaranteed the right to an impartial jury by
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.' The process by which
a jury is selected is known as the voir dire.2 Potential jurors are
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury... ." Id. See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue
Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107, 109 (1994). Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, criminal defendants have the right to be tried by an impartial jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community. Id.
Defendants also have separate rights, under Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment, either to have their trial conducted in the community in which the crime was
committed or to have the trial moved to a different venue if pretrial publicity or other fac-
tors render an impartial jury improbable in the original venue. Id. (citing Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (1988). "All litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to
grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes." Id.; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528
(1975) (holding that selection from representative cross-section of community is essential
element of Sixth Amendment); Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (stating that peremptory challenge
may not be used to deny right to sit on jury to entire group), overruled by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (rejecting evidentiary burden placed on defendant requiring
proof that peremptory challenge was systematically used to exclude jurors of defendant's
race); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 733 (noting that right to fair treatment is basic right of due
process).
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of
assuring, not a representative jury, but an impartial one. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 480 (1990) (stating that venire must be of fair cross section, but in selecting jury, both
sides may eliminate persons inclined against their interests); see also Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (explaining that if under-representation of one group is due to
systematic exclusion, then fair cross section requirement has been violated).
2 See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120
(1994). The court stated that although it is assumed that all citizens can put aside their
individual preconceived notions and prejudices, the voir dire is used to test that assump-
tion. Id. The peremptory challenge is an opportunity for the parties to exercise their own
intuitive judgment with respect to perceived juror bias. Id.; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that peremptory
challenge allows attorneys to act on instinct); Swain, 380 U.S. at 212. "This system ...
provides justification for striking any group of otherwise qualified jurors in any given case,
whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes." Id.; State v.
Weatherspoon, 514 N.W.2d 266, 276 (Minn. 1994) (Randall, J., concurring) (stating that
purpose of voir dire is to test potential juror's ability to set aside prejudices); Barbara D.
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 725, 771 (1992). The peremptory challenge is available to grant assurance
of an accurate verdict by "resolving doubts .. . in favor of exclusion." Id.
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questioned during the voir dire and are excluded if deemed biased
or ill-suited for the case at bar.3
Due to the fact that, in the past, the peremptory challenge was
often used by attorneys in order to eliminate jurors based on race,
the Supreme Court has restricted the uses of the challenge.4 In
Batson v. Kentucky,5 the Supreme Court prohibited the use of per-
emptory challenges based solely on race on the grounds that such
exclusion violated the Equal Protection rights of the defendant
and the jurors. 6 This limitation has been expanded beyond Bat-
son,7 causing uncertainty regarding the future of the peremptory
challenge.8 This expansion raises the issue of whose right is more
important; the rights of litigants to select impartial juries, and
3 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (stating that Alabama contended that its system of strikes
without cause or judicial review is important means of securing impartial jurors); Stilson v.
United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (noting that nothing in U.S. Constitution requires
Congress or States to grant peremptory challenges); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 408 (1894) (finding that defendant was not prejudiced by having to make his strikes
from list of qualified jurors without knowing those challenges made by government); see
also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892). "[F]or it is as Blackstone says, an
arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its
full purpose." Id.
4 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 725 (explaining that race discrimination has long been
part of jury selection).
5 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See Underwood, supra note 2, at 725. Since 1880, when the
Supreme Court found that a black criminal defendant, tried by an exclusively white jury,
had been denied equal protection in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), race
discrimination in the jury selection process has been of great constitutional concern. Id.
6 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (finding that prosecution cannot assume black jurors as group
will be partial towards black defendants).
7 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (extending Batson limi-
tation to gender because gender discrimination also violates equal protection); Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (holding criminal defendant, as well as prosecutor,
may not discriminate on racial grounds through peremptory challenges); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson limitation to pro-
hibit parties in civil lawsuits from excluding jurors solely on race); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 416 (1991) (expanding Batson limitation to situations where juror and defendant are
not of same race); see also Henry J. Reske, Another Limit on Peremptories, 80 A.B.A. J.,
June 1994, at 18 (noting that voir dire and juror questionnaires will become increasingly
important as attorneys try to justify their peremptory strikes).
8 See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REV. 808, 811 (1989).
The author explains that notwithstanding the importance of racial equality, Batson-type
limitations should not be applied to criminal defendants. Id.; Susan M. Sabers, The Absence
of State Action in Georgia v. McCollum, 39 S.D. L. REv. 159, 159 (1994). Traditionally, the
decision whether to strike a juror through the peremptory challenge has been vested with
the accused. Id. By finding that a criminal defendant was a state actor for purposes of jury
selection, the holding in McCollum significantly impeded a criminal defendant's ability to
select an impartial jury. Id; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352-53 (1992)
(illustrating limitations placed on peremptory challenges).
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thus ensure a fair trial, or the Equal Protection rights of potential
jurors. 9
Part One of this Note will focus on the function and use of the
peremptory challenge. Part Two will discuss Batson v. Kentucky 10
and its effect on the voir dire process. Part Three will examine
further limitations that the Supreme Court has placed on the use
of the peremptory challenge in cases following Batson v. Kentucky,
including the extension to gender. Finally, Part Four will discuss
the problems that may result from further limitations on the per-
emptory challenge and will suggest a balancing test to determine
whether a certain peremptory challenge should be permissible.
I. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. Uses of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge is a jury selection tool which allows a
litigant to eliminate a limited number of potential jurors without
cause." Attorneys use peremptory challenges to eliminate poten-
tial jurors whom they feel may be hiding their prejudices. 2 They
also allow attorneys to act upon hunches or instincts regarding
the opinions and prejudices which potential jurors may have
about the parties.13 Accomplished litigators can use their prior ex-
9 See Underwood, supra note 2 at 726 (arguing that focus should be on protecting juror's
rights).
10 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
11 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that peremptory challenge is by nature exercised without court's control or
inquiry); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). "The essential nature of the peremp-
tory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and with-
out being subject to the Court's control." Id.; E. Vaughan Dunnigan, Note, Discrimination
By the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355,
356 (1988) (noting that peremptory challenge, by nature, lends itself to use on grounds
normally thought irrelevant).
12 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The principle value of the
peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries." Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965)); Patrick J. Guinee, The Trend Toward the Extension of Batson
to Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 833, 834 (1994) (stating that per-
emptory is used to eliminate extremes of partiality assuring litigators that case will be
tried on evidence presented and not according to juror bias); Recent Case, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1164, 1166-67 (1994) (commenting that Davis court, in refusing to extend Batson to
religion, ignored First Amendment religious protection and sanctioned discrimination on
religious grounds); Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Peremptory Challenges, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 28, 1993, at 123 (discussing trial lawyers' difficulty in carefully and properly using
peremptory challenges); Reske, supra note 7, at 18 (claiming that limitations on peremp-
tory challenges increases risk that biased persons will serve on juries).
13 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In requiring counsel to pro-
vide explanations for excluding certain jurors, the Court is forcing them to articulate what
is often inarticulable. Id.; Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (noting that while challenges for cause
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perience to identify and filter out jurors whom they believe may be
harmful to their case. 14 This is critical when an attorney deems a
juror inappropriate, but cannot articulate a specific reason why,
and is thus unable to support a challenge for cause. 15 The nature
of the peremptory challenge is somewhat arbitrary in that it can
be used by attorneys without supplying concrete reasons for the
exclusion of a potential juror.16
B. History
The peremptory challenge is rooted in early English common
law, spanning from the Ordinance for Inquests, 17 through Black-
stone's era,' 8 to the present day in the United States. 19 Although
permit rejection of jurors on narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of
partiality, peremptory challenges permit rejection for real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1897));
Underwood, supra note 2, at 771. The peremptory challenge is important to the litigating
parties because it gives added assurance of an accurate verdict by "resolving doubts in
favor of exclusion." Id.; Mark Curriden, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge, 80 A.BA.
J., Jan. 1994, at 62. "Throughout history, lawyers have been allowed to use their peremp-
tory strikes to remove people who are likely to be predisposed." Id. at 64. "No one likes
discrimination, but this case comes down to whose rights should be given the most protec-
tion in court. The error being made is that we are giving more rights to the jurors not to be
discriminated against than we are to a defendant to select a fair and impartial jury." Id.
(quoting Professor Randolph Stone, ABA Criminal Justice Section Chair). "Every time you
use a strike, you are choosing one person over another. That's discrimination. But that
doesn't mean we should abandon what has worked for hundreds of years." Id. at 65. (quot-
ing Lois N. Beasfield, Assistant Attorney General).
14 See Guinee, supra note 12, at 834 (explaining that attorneys use prior experiences
when exercising peremptory challenges); Patricia F. Kaufman, The Beginning of the End of
Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 287, 292-93 (1993) (stating that peremptories are sole means of eliminating hidden
partiality); Reske, supra note 7, at 18 (limiting peremptories means greater chance of hav-
ing biased jurors); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that trial judge does not abuse discretion in allowing exclusion of juror if that
person's education is insufficient for legal issues at stake).
15 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that just because attorney's reason for excluding will not satisfy require-
ments for challenge for cause does not mean exclusion is not justified); Reske, supra note 7,
at 18 (noting that essence of challenge is its ability to be utilized without judicial inquiry).
16 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220 (1965) (noting that peremptory allows exclusion for real or perceived cause which law-
yer cannot easily designate or demonstrate); BLAcKSTONE's ComNmNTAREMS ON THE LAW
907 (Bernhard C. Gavit, ed., 1941) (stating that peremptory is arbitrary type of challenge).
17 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
18 BLAcKsToNE's COMMENTARMuS ON THE LAW, supra note 16, at 907 (describing function
of peremptory challenge).
19 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The peremptory's impor-
tance is confirmed by its persistence: it was well established at the time of Blackstone and
continues to endure in all the States." Id. (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481
(1990)); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992) (noting very old creden-
tials of the peremptory challenge and long and widely held belief in its necessity to trial
process); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 429 (1991). The Court stated:
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not explicitly granted by the Constitution, courts have deemed the
peremptory challenge a necessary part of jury selection through-
out the judicial history of the United States.2 ° Arguably, the use-
fulness of the peremptory challenge has been proven by its
longevity. 2
1
On the other hand, allowing blatant discrimination during the
voir dire should not be tolerated.22 Boundaries need to be set to
prevent abuse of the peremptory challenge.23 Although limitations
are necessary, altering such a long-standing practice of the law
should be done slowly and carefully.24 Nevertheless, in just the
past ten years, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed
and severely limited the peremptory challenge .25 Even though
there are substantial benefits to preventing discrimination, to do
so at the expense of impartial juries may be counter-productive.26
Last term, in Holland, we noted that "[tihe tradition of peremptory challenges for both
the prosecution and the accused was already venerable at the time of Blackstone....
was reflected in a federal statute enacted by the same Congress that proposed the Bill
of Rights.... was recognized in an opinion by Justice Story to be part of the common
law of the United States.... and has endured through two centuries in all the states
Id. (citing Holland, 493 U.S. at 481); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-19 (giving full and
detailed account of long history and evolution of peremptory challenge in United States and
England and its continuing significance in law of United States). BLAcKSTON,'s COMMENTA-
MreS ON TBE LAW, supra note 16, at 907 (describing functions of peremptory challenges and
illustrating their long history).
20 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (stating that persistence and use of
peremptories demonstrates that they are necessary (citing Lewis v. United States, 196 U.S.
370 (1892))).
21 See Dunnigan, supra note 11, at 364. "Despite its long standing existence, the unqual-
ified use of peremptory challenges is not 'essential to the fairness of trial by jury.'" Id.
(quoting Lewis v. United States., 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)); supra notes 16-17 and accom-
panying text (describing history and use of peremptory challenge).
22 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 727 (stating that exclusion based on race is harmful
not only to jurors but to society as well).
23 Id.
24 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (expressing great hesitation at prospect of expanding Batson to gender, thus further
limiting valuable uses of peremptory challenges).
25 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422 (prohibiting gender-based use of peremptory chal-
lenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defend-
ant's race-based peremptory challenge); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S.
614, 615 (1991) (prohibiting discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil cases); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (stating that defendants may object to race-based exclusion
of jurors even though defendant and jurors are not of same race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate equal protection).
26 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1433 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expres-
sing concern over characterization of criminal defendant as state actors and impact this
has on peremptory challenges).
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II. BATsoN v. KENTUCKY THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION
In the landmark 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court placed the first serious limitations on the use of the peremp-
tory challenge.27 In Batson, the prosecutor used peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude the only four black venire members, forcing a
black defendant to face an all white jury.2" The Court held that,
although prosecutors may use peremptory challenges in order to
obtain favorable juries, 29 the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids the use of peremptory challenges
based solely on race. 30 This protection applies to both the defend-
27 Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (stating that evidentiary burden placed on criminal defendant
claiming denial of equal protection through prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges must
be re-examined); cf Swain, 380 U.S. at 224-26 (requiring showing that prosecutor engaged
in pattern of discriminatory challenges), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99
(1986).
Although Bateon was the first U.S. Supreme Court case prohibiting discriminatory uses
of peremptory challenges, such discrimination had already been found to violate the state
constitutions of California and Massachusetts. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761
(Cal. 1978) (holding that defendant's right to trial by jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community was violated); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499,
515 (Mass. 1979) (stating that prosecutor's exclusion of witnesses was race-based, therefore
violating defendant's right to trial by jury fairly drawn from community), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979); see also Dunnigan, supra note 11, at 355 (stating that Batson overruled
Swain, which required defendant to show pattern of discrimination, and limited use of per-
emptories by prohibiting race-based challenges).
28 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. Prior to Batson, although the Court technically held that
purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection was violative of equal protection, it se-
verely limited a party's ability to support such a finding. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. According
to the Court in Swain, for criminal defendants to show purposeful discrimination, they
would have to show that the particular prosecutor in the case had systematically excluded
black jurors in a long pattern of cases. Id. The Court also held that the defendant is not
entitled to have a jury that contains a number of minority members proportional to the
number of minorities in the community. Id. at 208; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 372-73 (1991) (O'Connor, & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (stating that challenges which
merely have disproportionate effects on jury are not sufficient for equal protection viola-
tions); Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880) (holding that state statute al-
lowing only white men on juries violated Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause); cf J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (noting strikes based on characteristics disproportion-
ately associated with one gender can be appropriate absent showing of pretext).
For criticism of the Swain decision, see McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that Swain is inconsistent with
other showings of prima facie violation and imposes nearly insurmountable burden on de-
fendants); Swain, 380 U.S. at 231-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (stating that Court's deci-
sion imposes additional barriers to elimination of jury discrimination).
29 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (citing United States v. Robinson, 421 F.
Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman,
549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977)). The Court permitted peremptory challenges for any reason
related to achieving a favorable outcome. Id.
3o Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (referring to prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge). See 18
U.S.C. § 243 (1988). "No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be
prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any state on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."
Id.; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
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ant and the excluded juror .3  Equal Protection of the law guaran-
tees that the defendant will not face a jury that has been racially
stacked against him, and that a juror will not be excluded solely
based on race.3 2 Although the majority in Batson stated that its
holding would not ruin the effectiveness of peremptory chal-
lenges,33 the dissenting Justices believed that the challenge would
suffer grave damage. 4
Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissenting in Batson,3 5 criticized
the Court's failure to consider the important function served by
the peremptory challenge.3 6 The use of these challenges by attor-
neys, without explanation or cause, has long been regarded as a
means of strengthening our jury system.3 7 The peremptory chal-
(noting race is unrelated to person's fitness as juror); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The
Batson Court laid out the steps a defendant must take to support a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in jury selection. Id. First, a defendant must demonstrate mem-
bership in a recognizable racial group and that the prosecution has removed venire mem-
bers of that group through the use of peremptory challenges. Id. (citing Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977)). Second, the defendant may rely on the fact that peremptory
challenges lend themselves to discriminatory uses. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Third, the defendant must show that based on the
relevant facts and circumstances, it can be inferred that the prosecution used peremptory
challenges to exclude venire members because of their race. Id. After the defendant makes
a prima facie showing the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide race-neutral explana-
tions for the strikes. Id.; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. "The essential nature of the per-
emptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control." Id.; Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving
'Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. Rv. 545, 550-51 (1975) (quoting Swain, noting that
peremptories are exercised without stated reason); Guinee, supra note 12, at 834.
31 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
32 Id.
33 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99. "We do not agree that our decision today will undermine
the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice." Id.
34 Id. at 112-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) "[T]o permit inquiry into the basis for a per-
emptory challenge would force 'the peremptory challenge to collapse into the challenge for
cause.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also
Batson, 476 U.S. at 134-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices particularly
feared that the rule on impermissible uses of peremptory challenges might be extended to
other bases such as sex, age, and religion. Id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent-
ing Justices also feared that the limitation on peremptory challenges would be extended to
other parties in the lawsuit, such as defense attorneys. Id. at 119.
35 Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting peremptory challenges based on any clas-
sification could be objectionable under equal protection scrutiny).
36 Batson, 476 U.S. at 119 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger recognized
that "' [ tihe right of [the] challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect
fairness and impartiality in a trial.'" Id. (quoting W. FoRsriH, HISTORY OF TRLAL BY JURY
175 (1852). Chief Justice Burger further noted that "[t]he effect of the Court's decision..
will be to force the defendant to come forward and 'articulate a neutral explanation,' for his
peremptory challenge, a burden he cannot probably meet." Id. at 129; see also Guinee,
supra note 12, at 848 (concluding that Batson should remain sole limitation on peremptory
challenges); Underwood, supra note 2, at 760 n.159.
37 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 121. "Permitting unexplained peremptories has long been re-
garded as a means to strengthen our jury system... ." Id.; see also Babcock, supra note 30,
at 555. In discussing Swain,the author states that "the critical importance of the peremp-
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lenge allows both sides to eliminate extremes of partiality from
the jury"' and grants them the opportunity to ensure that the cho-
sen jurors will decide the case only on the basis of the evidence
presented.3 s
Chief Justice Burger also argued that if Batson was decided on
Equal Protection grounds40 rather than Sixth Amendment
grounds,4 ' then race should not be the only limitation placed on
the peremptory challenge.42 Burger predicted that every challenge
could be subjected to objection on the basis that, because it ex-
cluded a potential juror who had some characteristic not shared
by the remaining members, it constituted a "classification" subject
to equal protection scrutiny.43 In theory, most potential jurors
could establish at least one unique trait that distinguishes them
tory challenge and the implicit finding that its essence would be lost were the motives for
its exercise open for review." Id. (citations omitted).
38 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 120 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
39 Id. (explaining rationale of peremptory challenge).
40 See id. at 118 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting Batson Court based decision on equal
protection grounds); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310-12 (1880). The Strauder
Court held that the State denied a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it put
him on trial before a jury from which the prosecutor purposefully excluded members of his
race. Id. The Court further noted that this type of discrimination was exactly the type that
the then recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment sought to eliminate. Id. Purposeful ra-
cial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure. Id.; see also
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319 (1906) (noting that defendant has right to be tried by
jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria).
41 Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting petitioner specifically dis-
claimed any reliance on Equal Protection, instead basing his claim on Sixth Amendment,
although Court decided on Equal Protection grounds); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
.; cf Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 496 (1972). In Peters, the Court held that race-based
jury selection violates the criminal defendant's right to due process of law, even when the
Sixth Amendment jury right does not apply. Id.; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 632
(1968) (noting right to jury trial extends to serious criminal contempts).
42 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger argued:
[If conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants could
object to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); age, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976);
religious or political affiliation, Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); mental capacity, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985); number of children, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); living arrange-
ments, Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); and employment in
a particular industry, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), or
profession, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id.; "That the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its
limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible challenge on the basis of race." Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
43 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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from the non-excluded jurors, thus creating grounds for appeal.44
Although Batson has not been extended this far, Justice Burger
accurately predicted that the Batson holding would reach well be-
yond its originally intended limitation.45
III. THE EXPANSION OF BATSON
The Batson Court's holding originally was limited to the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors in crimi-
nal cases where the juror was of the same race as the defendant.46
In 1991, the Supreme Court expanded the Batson limitation to
cases where the defendant and the excluded juror are not of the
same race. 47 This limitation was further expanded just two
months later to apply in civil cases as well as in criminal cases.48
In 1992, the Supreme Court held that defense attorneys are also
barred from using race-based peremptory challenges. 49 Most re-
cently, the Supreme Court extended the Batson limitation beyond
race to include gender as well. 50
A. Limitation Applies Even When Defendant and Juror Are Of
Different Races
In Powers v. Ohio,51 the Supreme Court broadened the applica-
tion of the rule established in Batson.52 The Powers Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits race-based exclusion of
jurors, even when the potential jurors and the defendant are not
44 See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1138-41 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1097 (1984) (stating that it is probable that every peremptory chal-
lenge could be objectionable on basis that, because it excluded venireman who had some
characteristic not shared by remaining members of venire, it constituted "classification
subject to equal protection scrutiny") Id.
45 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing increasing limits on peremptories
following Batson); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that although something is gained by prohibiting
discriminatory peremptory challenges, in this instance, more is lost).
46 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
47 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
4S Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (stating that Bat-
son applies in civil context).
49 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
50 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
51 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
52 Id. (holding that Batson rule applies even when defendant and excluded juror are of
different races).
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of the same race.53 In Powers, the criminal defendant gained third
party standing to assert the equal protection rights of the jurors.54
The Court reasoned that even though the defendant was not being
directly harmed, a discriminatory peremptory challenge was im-
permissible because it condoned violation of the Constitution,55
cast doubt upon the judicial system,56 and allowed the rights of
excluded jurors to remain unvindicated 5 7 The rights of the jurors
were upheld using an Equal Protection analysis. 58 The Powers de-
cision significantly shifted the focus of the Batson protection to
serve the rights of the jurors and not just the rights of the liti-
gants. The Powers Court opened the door to claims based on any
violation of the jurors' Equal Protection rights, and it eventually
allowed limits on peremptory challenges to be applied to defense
counsel.5 9
53 Id. at 415. "To bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of the excluded
jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and
privilege of jury service." Id.
54 Id. at 410-16 (determining criminal defendant meets third party standing require-
ments to raise equal protection claim based on discriminatory exclusion of jurors from
panel because defendant suffered injury in fact, shares common interest in outcome with
juror and juror is hindered from protecting own interests); see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 112 (1976) (stating that to raise third party rights litigant must have "injury-in-fact");
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (granting standing to doctor fighting for right of
third parties to use contraceptives).
55 Powers, 499 U.S. at 412 (stating active discrimination by prosecutor through use of
peremptory challenge violates Constitution and lead to cynicism regarding jury's impartial-
ity and ability to adhere to law); Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 (holding that exclusion of black
citizens from jury violates Fourteenth Amendment); Swain, 380 U.S. at 223 (stating that
purposeful exclusion of blacks as jurors violates Equal Protection Clause).
56 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 412 (finding that wrongful exclusion of jurors based on race
casts doubts on court's ability to adhere to law); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88 (stating that
purposeful exclusion of black persons from juries undermines confidence in justice system);
Dunnigan, supra note 11, at 358 (suggesting that discriminatory jury selection might un-
dermine public confidence in fairness of judicial system).
57 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991) (stating that barriers to suit by juror are too
great); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1976) (stating that ability of third party to
assert own rights is factor in determining standing).
58 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 415-16 (stating that Fourteenth Amendment mandates elimi-
nating discrimination from all state acts); Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). Chief Justice Burger stated that Batson did not use conventional Equal Protection
analysis because it was limited to race. Id. at 123-24. If conventional analysis were to be
applied, it would include exclusions on many other bases, including but not limited to sex,
age and religion. Id.
59 Batson, 476 U.S. at 124-25 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger points out
that the Court failed to express whether the Constitution imposes a limit on the peremp-
tory challenge's use by defense counsel. Id. However, it is clear that the majority's holding
limits both prosecutors and defense attorneys. Id. at 126.
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B. Batson Applies to Civil Cases and to Criminal Defendants
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc.,6°  the
Supreme Court held that litigants in civil cases may not exercise
race-based peremptory challenges.61 In Georgia v. McCollum, 62
the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants are also barred
from using peremptory challenges based on the race of potential
jurors.63 These cases greatly expanded Batson's holding which
was originally limited to the use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution in criminal cases.64 The Court found both civil liti-
gants and criminal defendants to be "state actors," 65 bringing
their use of peremptory challenges within the control of the Equal
Protection Clause.66 Thus, these two cases further shifted the fo-
60 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
61 Id. at 616. The Edmonson Court's attention to the rights of excluded jurors picked up
a theme that was first sounded in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S., 303, 307-08 (1880)
(finding that Fourteenth Amendment supplies right to exemption from unfriendly legisla-
tion, including legal discrimination); Underwood, supra note 2 at 726 n.9 (citing Carter v.
Jury Commission, 306 U.S. 320 (1970) as only decision prior to 1991 that expressly stated
that potential jurors have right to be free from race discrimination during jury selection).
62 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
63 Id. at 2359 (finding that defendants have obligation to supply racially neutral expla-
nation for peremptory challenges if state demonstrates prima facie case of racial
discrimination).
64 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986) (stating that prosecutor is limited
in use of peremptory challenge); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,
1421 (1994). "Since Batson, we have reaffirmed repeatedly our commitment to jury selec-
tion procedures that are fair and nondiscriminatory." Id. "We have recognized that whether
the trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection
right to jury selection procedures that are free from state sponsored group stereotypes
rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice." Id.; McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (in-
cluding Ednonson and McCollum itself in "unbroken chain of decisions" rendered by Court
in attempt to prevent racial discrimination in jury selection procedures); Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (expanding harm of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
to not only excluded jurors and court system but to community at large); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991). The Court referred to Powers as part of
the culmination of a "century of jurisprudence dedicated to the elimination of racial preju-
dice within the jury selection process". Id. at 618; Curriden, supra note 13, at 63 (citing
Edmonson and McCollum in list of cases showing expansion of Batson); Andrew G. Gordon,
Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimina-
tion in Jury Selection, 62 FoRDHAm L. REv. 685, 691-93 (1993) (discussing Batson's
progeny).
65 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55. Racial discrimination only violates the Constitution
when attributable to state action. Id. at 2354. Thus, for an Equal Protection claim to be
raised in McCollum, the Court had to find that the criminal defendant was a state actor. Id.
The factors considered in finding a party to be a state actor are: the extent of the actor's
reliance on governmental assistance, whether the actor performs "a traditional governmen-
tal function," and whether the presence of governmental authority aggravates the injury
caused. Id. at 2355. The Court held that a defense attorney exercising peremptory chal-
lenges satisfies these state actor requirements. Id.
66 Id. at 2354, The Court in McCollum found the state action required by the Equal
Protection Clause by relying on the two part analysis it used in Edmonson. Id. The first
step asked "whether the claimed [constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise
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cus away from protection of the litigants rights towards protection
of the jurors' rights.
C. Extension to Gender
In April 1994, the Supreme Court extended Batson to prohibit
the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges based on gender
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.67 In J.E.B., the State of Alabama,
acting on behalf of a mother in a paternity suit, used nine of its
ten peremptory challenges to exclude men from the jury,68 result-
ing in an all-female jury.69 The Court reasoned that the State's
exclusion of males from the jury, solely because of their gender,
violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.v°
The J.E.B. Court expanded the restrictions placed on lawyers dur-
ing voir dire, but stated that this decision did not implicitly elimi-
nate all peremptory challenges.7 1 It appears that it may be diffi-
cult, after this latest expansion of Batson, to stop the further
erosion of the peremptory challenge; however, courts must find a
way to preserve this most important challenge. 2
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence in J.E.B. stated
that the extension of Batson to gender should be limited to the
state's use of peremptory challenges.7 3 Justice O'Connor noted
of a right or privilege having its source in state authority." Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)). The McCollum Court held that the first step was satis-
fied because peremptory challenges were established by state law. Id. at 2355. The second
step asks whether the party causing the deprivation can be described as a state actor. Id.
Characteristics to be considered are the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance, if the actor is performing a "traditional governmental finction," and whether
the governmental authority involved aggravates the injury suffered. Id. The Court found
that criminal defendants rely heavily on governmental assistance, that peremptory chal-
lenges are a traditional governmental function, and that the courtroom setting could
greatly intensify the effects felt from discrimination. Id. at 2355-56.
67 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. The Court stated: "In view of these concerns, the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the
assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than
the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man." Id.
68 Id. at 1421-22. 36 potential jurors were assembled, 12 males and 24 females. Id. After
three jurors were removed for cause, the panel consisted of 33 jurors, 10 of whom were
male. Id.
69 Id. at 1422.
70 Id. at 1421. The Court stated: "We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality." Id.
71 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (explaining that par-
ties may still remove potential jurors whom they feel are less acceptable than others; how-
ever, gender cannot serve as reason for this removal).
72 Babcock, supra note 30, at 552 (stating that peremptory challenges serve functions
that challenges for cause could not).
73 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The state of Alabama
brought suit on behalf of the petitioner, thus it truly was a "state actor" who made the
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that extending Batson to gender would burden the state and fed-
eral trial process, 74 limit the ability of counsel to act on gender
based assumptions,75 and bring the Court a step closer to the
elimination of peremptory challenges.7v
Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented, stating that Batson
should not be extended beyond race at all. 77 He noted that race-
based characteristics trigger the "strict scrutiny" standard of re-
view, 78 whereas gender-based classifications only trigger height-
ened scrutiny.79 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that classifica-
tions based on gender are less harmful than those based on race.80
challenges in question. Id. Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her position that it was a mistake
for the Court to find civil litigants and criminal defendants to be state actors for equal
protection purposes. Id.; see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (not-
ing that state action was necessary for invoking Equal Protection Clause). Id.
74 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The addition of Batson re-
lated duties to already overburdened courts has been often used as another reason to limit
Batson. Id.; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). "Thus, yet another complexity is added to an increasingly Byzantine system of
justice that devotes more and more of its energy to side shows and less and less to the
merits of the case." Id.; Batson, 476 U.S. at 131 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (wishing luck to
federal and state judges who will have to deal with additional procedural requirements);
see also Guinee, supra note 12, at 845. "In practice, the expansion of Batson to embrace sex-
based challenges will lengthen the voir dire, as virtually every strike may be challenged on
the basis of suspected gender discrimination." Id.
75 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that majority holding
severely limits counsel's ability to act on intuition).
76 See id. at 1431 (discussing costs of extending Batson to gender); see also Reske, supra
note 7, at 18. The author states that Batson and its progeny, including J.E.B., are high
stakes cases because there is no harmless error analysis when a peremptory challenge is
found to be discriminatory. Id.; Curriden, supra note 13, at 64 (stating that value of per-
emptory strikes would be sacrificed if Batson were to be expanded). But see Guinee, supra
note 12, at 845. There are some commentators who believe that it would be best to com-
pletely eliminate the peremptory challenge. Id. (citing Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Per-
emptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMp. L. REv. 369, 371 (1992)).
77 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1434-35 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist referred to Justice O'Connor's prior statement that Batson
should not apply "[o]utside the uniquely sensitive area of race." Id. (citing Brown v. North
Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
78 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that race-based
classifications trigger strict scrutiny).
79 Id. (stating that gender-based classifications trigger heightened scrutiny); see also,
e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickerson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (noting that heightened
scrutiny has generally been applied to cases of gender-based and illegitimacy-based dis-
crimination); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing different levels of scrutiny
applied to equal protection claims); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
723-24 (1982) (stating that in order to pass heightened scrutiny test, must show that gen-
der-based policy was necessary to achieve important governmental objective); Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (noting that classifications based on gender must serve signif-
icant government interests).
80 See, e.g., Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458-59 (stating that heightened scrutiny is less de-
manding standard of review than strict scrutiny); Montalvo-Huertas v. Rivera-Cruz, 885
F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that classifications based on sex only require height-
ened scrutiny).
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He also argued that the costs of extending Batson to gender, such
as longer trials, more complex appeals, and less control by liti-
gants, outweigh any benefits."'
Justice Antonin Scalia also dissented and noted that since all
groups are subjected to peremptory challenges, no one group is
denied equal protection."2 Justice Scalia argued that by unneces-
sarily extending Batson to gender, the Court would eventually ex-
tend Batson further than intended. 3
D. Possible Expansion to Religion
In May 1994, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to
State v. Davis, 8 4 a Minnesota case which involved the exclusion of
a juror by a peremptory challenge based on religion. 5 In Davis,
the prosecutor removed a black man from the jury and the defense
objected on Batson grounds. 86 The prosecutor was required to pro-
vide a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.8 7 The prosecu-
tor explained that the potential juror was not stricken from the
jury because of his race, but rather because he was a Jehovah's
Witness."" The court found that religious discrimination in jury
81 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435.
82 Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Just as the plaintiff in J.E.B. used its peremptory
challenges to exclude men, the male defendant used all but one of his peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude women. Id. Thus, both men and women actually were treated equally. Id.;
see also, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that when a group, like all others, has been made subject of peremptory challenges, it has
received equal treatment); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that race-based strikes are permissible provided that no one race is
singled out, all races being excluded equally).
83 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1439. Justice Scalia also referred to Burger's dissent in Batson
(476 U.S. at 124), which listed many of the possible groups to which the Batson decision
could extend. Id.
84 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
5 See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that strik-
ing potential juror because of religious affiliation is not violation of equal protection), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); cf State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864,869 (Minn. 1991) (holding
that Batson limitation does not extend to age discrimination).
86 Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768. The defendant claimed that the prosecutor struck the po-
tential juror because of his race. Id.
87 Id. at 768; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986). The Supreme Court
stated that the prosecutor must demonstrate that permissible race-neutral criteria were
used. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1971)).
88 Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768. The prosecutor explained that "it was highly significant to
the State... that the man was a Jahovah [sic] Witness. I have a great deal of familiarity
with the sect of Jahovah's [sic] Witness. I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge
left, strike or fail to strike a Jahovah [sic] Witness from my jury." Id. She explained that
since Jehovah's Witnesses were reluctant to exert control over fellow humans, such persons
would not make good jurors in criminal trials. Id.
In my experience.., that faith is very integral to their daily life in many ways, many
Christians are not. That was reinforced at least three times a week when he goes to
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selection is not so severe a problem as to warrant extending Bat-
son, thus further eroding the peremptory challenge system.89 The
defendant was convicted9 ° and the Supreme Court denied cert-
iorari.91
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in denial of certiorari provides
some insight into the Court's view on religion-based peremptory
challenges.92 She noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had
observed that a person's religion is not as obvious as his/her gen-
der or race and that questions regarding a juror's religion during
voir dire are usually considered improper. 93 Restricting peremp-
tory challenges based on less self-evident characteristics, such as
religion, could lead to Batson type objections to peremptory chal-
lenges on an unlimited number of characteristics.94 The peremp-
church for separate meetings. The Jahovah [sic] Witness faith is of a mind that the
higher powers will take care of all things necessary. In my experience Jahovah [sic]
Witness are [sic] reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in the
Court House.
Id.
89 Id. at 768. The Minnesota Supreme Court gave two main reasons for refusing to ex-
tend Batson to religion. Id. One reason was that the U.S. Supreme Court had not applied
Batson to any area outside of race. Id. However, the Court did note that the U.S. Supreme
Court would soon examine peremptory challenges based on gender (citing J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1994)). Id. The second reason was that religious affilia-
tion is not as self-evident as race or gender. Id. at 771.
Prior discrimination based on religion in jury selection "is not as prevalent, or flagrant,
or historically ingrained" as is discrimination based on race. Id. Thus, the Court reasoned,
Batson's extension to religion would unnecessarily erode the peremptory challenge while
still failing to remedy any injustice to religious groups. Id.; see also United States v. Clem-
mons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court explained that the defendant's right to
equal protection was not violated by the prosecutor's strike of prospective jurors, even if thejurors were, in fact, black, where prosecutor subjectively believed a prospective juror to be
of Asian-Indian origin and struck him because of uncertainty about his religious perspec-
tive). Id.
90 State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
91 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
92 Id. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that there are significant differences
between religious affiliation and gender).
93 Id. But see id. at 2120-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that in
light of the J.E.B. decision (applying Batson to gender), Batson could very well be applied
to other biases outside of race, such as religion. Id. Batson had previously been limited to
race-based challenges, but Justice Thomas points out that once that wall was broken, no
logical stopping point exists. Id. at 2121.
94 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120; see also Lawrence S. Robbins, High Court Sends Mixed
Messages, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1994, at S1. The author notes:
J.E.B. marks the Court's first extension of Batson to a classification other than race. It
now remains to be seen whether Batson will be extended to peremptory challenges
based on potential juror's religion. Although the Court recently denied certiorari in a
case involving just this issue, perhaps because of its reluctance to revisit the controver-
sial area of peremptory challenges so soon after J.E.B., a peremptory strike based on
religion appears to violate the principle elaborated in J.E.B., and in time the issue is
likely to return to the Supreme Court.
Id.
468 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:453
tory challenge must be shielded from further restrictions which
threaten its effectiveness. 95 In order to preserve the peremptory
challenge, the Court must decide against future expansion of Bat-
son to religion. 96
IV. ARGUMENT AGAINST FURTHER EXPANSION
Batson was intended to recognize a person's right to be free from
racial discrimination in the jury selection process.9 7 It was then
expanded to include a prohibition of discrimination based on gen-
der.98 It now appears that Batson is becoming a permanent road-
block to peremptory challenges,9 9 and subsequently, to the ability
of litigants to select an impartial jury.100 The Supreme Court, hav-
ing focused on the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause,' 0 ' may
be systematically eliminating the peremptory challenge.10 2
95 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that further limitations on peremptory challenges could erode this ef-
fective tool).
96 Id. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Court's decision to extend
Batson to gender for government's use only, but arguing against further expansion).
97 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (stating that State exercise of peremp-
tory challenges is subject to Equal Protection Clause); see also Underwood, supra note 2, at
725-26. The argument that peremptory challenges based solely on race violates the crimi-
nal defendant's right to equal protection of the laws is frequently invoked for the ban on
jury discrimination. Id. at 728 (stating that this argument is flawed since rights of jurors
should be considered in this situation). Id.
98 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
99 See Guinee, supra note 12, at 845; see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). "In extending Batson to gender we have added an additional burden to the
stated and federal trial process and taken a step closer to eliminating the peremptory chal-
lenge ... ." Id.
100 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The principal value of the
peremptory challenge is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries. Id. (citing Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965)).
101 See Dunnigan, supra note 11, at 358. The Equal Protection Clause does not provide
that all people shall be free from discrimination, but rather that [nmo State shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). "The right to participate as a juror without reference to one's race
is a federal right, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and a defendant deprivesjurors of that right when she challenges them solely because of their race." Id. at 359; see
also Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (stating that to establish violation of Equal Protection Clause
in jury selection, defendant must show that there was pattern of repeated exclusion of
members of particular race); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (laying
foundation for Batson and its progeny by holding that state denied African-American his
Equal Protection rights by trying him before jury that had purposely excluded members of
his race).
102 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor stated that "[i]n extending Batson to gender we have added an
additional burden to the state and federal trial process, taken a step closer to eliminating
the peremptory challenge, and diminished the ability of litigants to act on sometimes accu-
rate gender-based assumptions about juror attitudes." Id.; State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767,
771 (Minn. 1993) (explaining that further extending Batson would further complicate and
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Although it would be optimal to fully preserve the equal protec-
tion rights of the jurors, it is not always possible to do so because
their rights may conflict with the need of the litigants to select
impartial juries through the use of peremptory challenges. 1 0 3 Per-
emptory challenges work by allowing parties to exclude jurors
whom they feel may be predisposed against them.104 Sometimes
this decision is reached by relying on group generalizations re-
garding the potential juror.10 5 Even by thorough questioning, at-
torneys cannot always uncover jurors' true beliefs.' 0 6 Group char-
acterizations or generalizations may be the only factor an attorney
has to rely on.107 From a statistical standpoint it may be substan-
tiated that certain gender, religious, or racial groups favor partic-
ular types of litigants.'08 Although such generalizations are often
not true, parties to a case must often rely on such generalizations
in an attempt to select a jury that is most favorable to them. 0 9
Since cases can be won or lost by the vote of one juror, in some
situations litigants should be able to use any juror characteristics
available to them in order to decide whether to exclude a juror. 10
erode peremptory challenge). But see J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. The Court explained that
this latest decision was not intended to eliminate the use of peremptory challenges alto-
gether. Id. "Parties may still remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than
others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id.
103 See Curriden, supra note 13, at 62. The author quotes University of Chicago law
professor Randolph Stone, who states that although no one likes discrimination, it comes
down to a question of whose rights deserve the most protection. Id.
104 See Babcock, supra note 30, at 549-58 (discussing purpose and function of peremp-
tory challenges).
105 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). "We know that like race, gender matters. A plethora of studies make clear that in
rape cases, for example, female jurors are somewhat more likely to convict than male ju-
rors." (citing R. HASTIE, ET AL., INsmE THE JuRY 140-41 (1983)).
106 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 128 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986)) (stating that jurors are reluctant to reveal
prejudices and that excluding jurors of race different than defendant's may be only means
of eliminating such prejudice).
107 Id.
108 See id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541,
554 (5th Cir. 1986)). "To suggest that a particular race is unfit to judge in any case neces-
sarily is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may have its own special concerns, or
even may tend to favor its own, is not." Id. at 123.
109 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing juror's reluctance
to discuss prejudices); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that attorneys must sometimes rely on their instincts in exercising peremptory challenges).
110 See Brown, supra note 1, at 119-25 (explaining that individual's race or gender may
play part in how they interpret case).
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Sometimes, even without statistical support, the potential ramifi-
cations may be such as to warrant the use of generalizations.'1 1
The problem with the use of peremptory challenges made based
on such classifications is that the Equal Protection rights of those
jurors might be violated. 1 2 Thus, the needs of the litigants to use
certain classifications to help them select favorable juries conflicts
with the need to protect the rights of those jurors." 13
One way to remedy this conflict is to balance the needs of the
litigants to select a favorable jury against the Equal Protection
rights of the jurors." 4 In executing such a balancing test, courts
should consider the potential gain or loss to the litigants," 5 the
degree of harm that may be inflicted upon potential jurors, 1 16 the
needs of the state to protect the litigants" 7 as well as the ju-
rors, 8 and the proper functioning and legitimacy of the judicial
system as a whole." 9
To illustrate how this balancing test would work, consider the
example of a defendant in a criminal case who wishes to exclude a
juror based on the juror's age, religion, or gender. In balancing
the rights of the defendant against those of the juror, it is appar-
ent that the defendant has his liberty at stake, whereas the harm
to the juror would most likely consist of embarrassment or frus-
111 Id.; see also Babcock, supra note 30, at 554. "[W]e have evolved in the peremptory
challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is
true more often than not.' Id.
112 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 726.
113 Cf J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing impact these limi-
tations have on litigants).
114 Id. at 1426, 1431.
115 See id. at 1431 (asserting that peremptory challenge is fundamental part of selecting
impartial juries); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (stating that protecting jurors over defendants is serious misordering of priorities,
leaving defendants with less means of protecting themselves).
116 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994). "All persons, when
granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily
because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce pat-
terns of historical discrimination." Id.; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) (holding
that race-based exclusion violates juror's right to participate in civic life); Batson, 476 U.S.
at 87 (stating that United States Supreme Court has long recognized that denial of jury
service based on race is unconstitutional).
117 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). "Purposeful racial discrimination in
selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him
the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." Id.
118 See Curriden, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that discriminatory challenges subject
individual juror to public discrimination) (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2346
(1992)).
119 See Curriden, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that discriminatory challenges undermine
public confidence in judicial system).
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tration.120 Although the state should not seek to promote this type
of harm to jurors, the interest in protecting the defendant's liberty
outweighs the need to protect the juror.'21 In contrast, civil liti-
gants will usually only suffer financial harm from a negative jury
verdict. 122 In such a situation, it seems that the rights of the liti-
gants and the rights of the jurors are more balanced. Depending
on the facts of each case, such as the amount a litigant stands to
lose and the effect that loss will have upon a litigant, the balance
may tip in favor of either the litigants or the juror. 12  It seems
more likely that a juror's rights will outweigh a litigant's rights in
a civil case than in a criminal case.124 This difference in treatment
is justified because the litigants are in different situations, the
criminal defendant standing to lose much more than a civil
litigant.125
The peremptory challenge was designed to protect the rights of
the litigants. 126 Their rights are of paramount importance because
the litigants will be directly affected by the outcome of the case.'12
120 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that no harm is done to
female litigant who is struck because she is not well disposed to litigant's case); State v.
Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). "The fact
that some unbiased jurors may be excused in the process is an affordable price to pay for
removing doubts about a particular juror's impartiality and competence, especially when
the vote of one biased juror can make a critical difference." Id.
121 See supra note 118 (describing effects on juror).
122 See contra J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). "Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is funda-
mental to our democratic system." Id. ; Underwood, supra note 2, at 726-27 (explaining
severe damage incurred).
123 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, these differences mean that the balance should tilt in favor of peremptory
challenges when sex, not race, is the issue." Id.
124 Contra Underwood, supra note 2, at 755 (stating that limitations should apply
equally to criminal and civil litigants).
125 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 745 (suggesting this as a possible argument but
disagreeing with its validity).
126 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Limiting the accused's use
of the peremptory is a 'serious misordering of our priorities,' for it means 'we have exalted
the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it
is the defendant, not the jurors who faces imprisonment or even death.' "Id. (quoting Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). See also Gold-
wasser, supra note 8, at 808. The author states, "[b]ecause of the protective function of the
jury itself, the peremptory challenge in criminal trials 'has long been recognized primarily
as a device to protect defendants.'" Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242
(1965)).
127 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430."Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration
of justice is fundamental to our democratic system." Id. Cf id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). "The peremptory challenge is a paramount right to the accused." Id.
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Jurors, on the other hand, suffer few, if any, consequences from
exclusion, and may even desire to be excluded. 128
Given the purposes of the peremptory challenge and its function
within our judicial system, 129 the Supreme Court's limitations 13
and potential limitations13  present serious threats to the very
existence of the challenge. 32 As the Court limits the ability of the
parties to exclude potential jurors, it is more likely that a biased
or ill-suited juror will be chosen.' Excluding an unbiased juror is
a small price to pay for removing doubts about a particular juror's
impartiality, especially when the vote of one biased juror can
make a critical difference. 134
128 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431-32 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); But see J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 (stating that all potential jurors have right
not to be excluded summarily based on discriminatory presumptions); Batson, 476 U.S. at
89. The Court stated that t]he State's privilege to strike individual jurors through per-
emptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Id.; see
also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 402, 407 (1991) (explaining that privilege ofjury duty allows
significant participation in democratic process); Underwood, supra note 2, at 743. "Whether
jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the state may no more extend it to
some of its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discrimi-
nate in the offering and withholding of the elective franchise." Id. (quoting Carter v. Jury
Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)).
129 State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993). "We can not hold that the Consti-
tution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges
in any given case." Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965)).
130 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (holding that the limitation extends to gender as well);
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992) (stating that criminal defendants are
prohibited from excluding potential jurors solely on basis of race); Edmondson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (further expanding limitation to civil litigants); Pow-
ers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (prohibiting exclusion even when juror and defendant
are of different races); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (prohibiting exclusion solely on basis of race).
131 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (examining J.E.B. decision prohibiting
use of peremptory challenge based on gender). But see supra notes 82-89 and accompanying
text (discussing Davis decision denying extension of Batson to religious affiliation).
132 See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 769 (stating that due to value of peremptory challenge
court cannot examine reason behind every peremptory challenge); see also J.E.B. 114 S. Ct.
1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated,
"[w]e also increase the possibility that biased jurors will be allowed unto the jury, because
sometimes a lawyer will be unable to provide an acceptable gender-neutral explanation
even though the lawyer is in fact correct that the juror is unsympathetic." Id. The principal
value of the peremptory challenge is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries. Id. at
1430; Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (explaining that essential nature of peremptory challenge is
that it can be exercised without having to justify it).
134 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 728-36 (arguing that racial composition ofjury may
or may not affect verdict); J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although
every citizen has a fundamental right to have the opportunity to be selected to sit on a jury,
and although discrimination is harmful in whatever form it appears, the fact still remains
that the injury to the litigants far exceeds the injury to a particular juror who is unfairly
excused. Id. This is particularly true in the case of a defendant in a criminal trial. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The peremptory challenge is an important and essential tool in
litigation, where it serves an imperative function in selecting a
fair and impartial jury. The usefulness of this challenge has been
seriously diminished by the limitations placed upon it. Although
reducing discrimination is an extremely important goal, the cost
of meeting this goal should not reduce the likelihood of obtaining a
fair and impartial jury. Since the litigants themselves have much
more at stake than the jurors, justice requires that no further lim-
itations be placed on the use of the peremptory challenge.
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